Many scholars have identified stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) as ardent supporters of Europe. This support has been explained as a result of positive developments in supranational integration that convinced these actors that Europe could facilitate the achievement of their territorial demands. Other work, however, leads to an expectation that SNRPs that mobilise within island regions that are geographically distant from the European centre of power (Brussels) will adopt more Eurosceptic positions. This article aims to test these competing hypotheses about the positioning of SNRPs on Europe. It does so by examining the attitudes of SNRPs in two island regions in the Mediterranean: Corsica and Sardinia. The findings suggest that SNRPs in both places can not be adequately categorised as either Europhile or Eurosceptic. The article examines the role of several context-and actor-specific factors in shaping the complex positioning of island nationalists in Corsica and Sardinia on the issue of Europe.
Introduction
From the late 1980s, calls for a 'Europe of the Regions' won the support of stateless nationalist and regionalist parties (SNRPs) 1 across Europe (De Winter and Gómez-Reino 2002; De Winter and Lynch 2008; Elias 2008a,b; Hepburn 2008 Hepburn , 2010 . It was hoped that a regionalised Europe comprised of stateless nations and peoples would eventually replace that of an intergovernmental Europe with power wielded by states.
In response, many SNRPs altered their self-determination goals to fit the evolving European context: the Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru in Wales, the Catalan
Convergència i Unió, Union Valdôtaine and the Flemish Volksunie perceived the
European Union (EU) as an alternative framework to the state for pursuing selfdetermination (Lynch 1996; Guibernau 1999; Elias 2006 Elias , 2008 Hepburn 2006 Hepburn , 2010 McGarry and Keating 2006) .
For this reason, SNRPs are generally presented as ardent supporters of
European integration (Hix and Lord, 1997; Marks and Wilson, 2000; Marks et al, 2002) . Jolly (2007: 114) However, other work gives good reason to expect that SNRPs, especially in island territories, may not necessarily always be strong supporters of Europe. For example, Berezin and Díez-Medrano (2008) demonstrate that geographical distance from the EU's centre of power (Brussels) decreases support for European integration.
People living in territories on the extreme periphery of Europe, and which have a strong sense of national identity, are more likely to be mistrustful of Europe. Such mistrust may be especially pronounced in peripheral island territories where globalising processes are perceived to be in constant tension with island insularity, as they represent a 'totalizing trend' that levels territorial boundaries (Baldacchino 2004; Clark 2004) . Globalisation and supranational integration may also be perceived as a modern form of colonialism for islands with a colonial past, which often develop 'discourse of resistance' to defend their autonomy (Hay 2006: 28-9) . This is evident in the fact that every island member-state of the EU, as well as several island regions, have negotiated special arrangements safeguarding their jurisdiction over matters that are perceived as vital to their culture and society (Warrington and Milne 2007: 390) .
As such, insularity is seen to be an important variable affecting political responses to European integration. Owing to the physical separation of island regions from the mainland, this leads to a degree of isolation in the evolution of island society and politics, as well as dependence (or interdependence) on larger political actors (Baldacchino 2004; Warrington & Milne 2007) . While islands arguably constitute just one type of periphery (others include territories isolated simply by distance or geographical barriers such as mountains, i.e. Alpine territories), island scholars maintain that there is something unique about political and social processes on islands resulting from their physical boundedness. This body of literature thus leads us to expect SNRPs in island contexts to be more anti-European than Europhile. 
The Island Nations of Corsica and Sardinia
Islands have not generally attracted the attention of political scientists, despite representing the archetypal 'periphery' in centre-periphery studies as a 'body of land surrounded with water which is inescapably isolated from and peripheral to continental areas' (Royle 2001: 42) . And yet, islands are extremely valuable units of analysis for the study of territorial politics. On one hand, they comprise self-contained territorial systems, which provide an excellent testing ground for examining how territory confines, shapes and informs politics. At the same time, the defining characteristic of islands -their insularity or 'islandness' -requires a certain degree of interdependence with external actors (Baldacchino and Milne 2000) . Insularity or islandness may be defined 'as the dynamics of the natural boundary and the resulting island qualities, including elements geographical (for example, degree of separation from a mainland), political (often expressed through tensions between autonomy and dependence on a mainland jurisdiction) and social (such as islander identity and sense of place)' (Jackson 2008) .
Island scholars argue that the special characteristics of islands make them quite distinct from other forms of (peripheral) territories. According to Baldacchino (2004) , the spatial separateness and 'geographical precision' of small islands encourages forms of governance and political dynamics that are quite idiosyncratic.
For instance, insularity has led many islands such as Åland, Bermuda, the Canary Islands, the Isle of Man and Tasmania to share their sovereignty with larger states (though a number of secessionist movements have emerged to contest these relations, for instance in Papa New Guinea and Fiji). Other scholars have focussed on the social aspects of insularity. For instance, Hache (1998: 47) believes that the geographical characteristic of insularity is used by islanders in order to assert a distinctive identity and to justify demands for enhancing their economic, social, cultural and political situation, whilst Hay (2003: 203) believes that the water boundary is conducive to psychological distinctiveness, because it promotes clearer, 'bounded' identities.
Yet whilst many scholars have argued that islands possess unusual characteristics, in this article we envisage islands to lie on a centre-periphery continuum -at the far side of 'peripherality'. This does not mean that islands do not share aspects of peripherality with other non-island territories (we believe they often do); instead, it means that the experience of peripherality and isolation is enhanced to the greatest extent in the island context. As such, we seek to explore whether and how extreme peripherality -which we understand as situations of insularity -has shaped island party responses to Europe.
In this analysis, we focus on a particular type of island entity: island regions.
For the purposes of this paper, an 'island region' is a water-bound territorial entity 
Corsica
Corsica was a Genoese colony until 1768, when the island was sold to France in response to a declaration of the island as a sovereign nation by the Corsican patriot Pascal Paoli in 1755 (Loughlin 1989; Caratini 2003) . The French army swiftly asserted control over its newly acquired territory, and Corsica's status as an island region without any special recognition of its historical, cultural and linguistic specificities remained largely uncontested until the post-World War Two period.
From the 1950s onwards, a state programme of economic modernisation initiated a period of dramatic economic growth (Loughlin 1989: 138-145 Like Corsica, a number of economic modernisation programmes were introduced by the Italian state from the 1960s onwards to replace Sardinia's traditional pastoral economy with high-technology industries such as petrochemicals, steelworks and oil refineries (Mattone 1982; Casula 2005; Hospers and Benneworth 2003) . However, as the industrial plants failed to provide many jobs and pollution was rife, people turned against the 'cathedrals in the desert'. This degenerated into banditry and kidnapping in the mountain areas of Sardinia (Melis 1982) , and spurred a reinvigorated nationalist movement focused on valorising Sardinian identity. On the back of a cultural 'neosardismo' movement that sought to valorise the language, identity and traditions of the Sardinian nation, the Psd'Az recovered its electoral fortunes, which had dipped to 6-7% of the vote as a result of its participation in unpopular Christian Democratic coalition governments. Following an upsurge in identity politics in the 1980s, the party was able to capture over 15% of the vote.
However, at the same time the Psd'Az suffered from internal problems, due mainly to disagreement between the independence-seeking and pro-federalist wings, which splintered the party in the late 1990s. Since then, Sardinia has witnessed the emergence of two radical independence-seeking SNRPs: Sardigna Natzione (SN) and
Indipendènzia Repùbrica de Sardegna (IRS).
The competition between these three parties ultimately fractured and weakened the nationalist vote.
European integration and stateless nationalism in the Mediterranean
The deepening of European integration in the 1980s was met with a mixed response from political actors in Sardinia and Corsica. Whilst some SNRPs were supportive of European integration from the outset, others vigorously opposed supranational project as too centralising, too distant, and too unrelenting on peripheral economies.
However, changes in European regional policy, the creation of EU committees tasked with alleviating problems of insularity, and the prospects for autonomy within a regionalised Europe changed the attitudes of SNRPs in these two places.
Corsican nationalism
For moderate Corsican SNRPs, such as the UPC, Corsica's geographical location within the Mediterranean and its historical experience at the heart of European trading routes, made the island European by default (Elias, 2008: 115) . A deep-rooted ideological Europeanism translated into a keen interest in the implications of European integration for the future territorial status of the island. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the focus of the UPC was on the political implications of European integration for generating new pressures on the French government to devolve political autonomy to Corsica. In contrast, economic integration was perceived to be of little importance, since this would be unlikely to undermine the state's stranglehold on the island's economic decision-making.
With no regional institutions prior to 1982, and with traditional clans' monopoly of parliamentary representation at the state level (Elias, 2008a: 117) , the UPC viewed Europe as an arena within which to publicise its territorial demands. The UPC established contacts with international organisations and other like-minded SNRPs in Europe, campaigning for 'an internal statute of autonomy' for the Corsican nation within a 'democratic and progressive Europe of the Peoples' (Arritti 1978) .
The reform of European regional policies and the creation of a legal framework for protecting minority rights in the 1980s reaffirmed the UPC's belief in the inevitability of the emergence of a regional Europe (Elias 2008a: 121-122 
Sardinian nationalism
From the creation of the first European institutions in the 1950s, many Sardinian parties were sceptical about the supranational project, which was viewed as another form of distant authority that was dominated by Northern European interests (Cardia 1982: 188) . This was compounded by the fact that Sardinia's first experience of European economic integration was of 'a cruel and cutting form' (ibid). Owing to the requirements of the Common Agricultural Policy, traditional pastoral areas were supplanted by modern 'agro-zootecnica' producing meat and dairy products, which was resented by the local population. Political debates during the first elections to the European Parliament in 1979 revolved around how to make modernisation less destructive of the traditional ways of life in Sardinia (Cardia 1982: 189 However, the party also acknowledges that particular aspects of European integration have presented major challenges for Sardinia, whose greatest handicap is one of physical isolation, i.e. transportation and communications with the rest of Europe are highly difficult and costly. In response, the party has proposed a number To provide an overarching political and legal framework for its Mediterranean economic plans, the Psd'Az argues that Sardinia should be given the right to instigate direct relations with the national community of states with which the EU has a treaty of association, i.e. the countries in the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle (Elias 2008a: 131) . Importantly, these parties remain highly critical of many of the institutional/policy aspects of Europe.
Based on these observations, the hypothesis positing the innate proEuropeanism of SNRPs must be qualified in these two cases. Island SNRPs are not unconditionally supportive of European integration across time, space and policy area.
Whilst some SNRPs have been shown to be ideologically committed to the idea of European integration, others opposed the European project in principle. The moderation of this anti-Europeanism during the 1990s was a function of the perceived economic benefits received by the substate nation. This indicates a strongly instrumental and opportunistic approach to Europe, with party positions shifting as the costs and benefits of European integration are perceived to vary over time.
At the same time, the second hypothesis regarding the relationship between geographical distance and support for the integrationist project must also be qualified.
Although parties in these two peripheral regions were concerned about being further These differences in constitutional architecture aside, state relations also affected the degree to which 'Europe' was central to nationalist strategies to win greater self-determination. In both cases, the European dimension was of limited salience in nationalist politics because of the overwhelming focus on relations with the state as the main avenue by which autonomy could be enhanced. This is ironic since all SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia initially adopted their pro/anti EU positions in an effort to liberate themselves from the state.
Economic Insularity
As noted earlier, Jolly (2007) has argued that SNRP support for European integration rests on their belief that Europe enhances the economic viability of regional autonomy. However, whilst this may be true of stateless nations that are economically prosperous, it does not hold for the two underdeveloped island nations examined here.
SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia were initially very much opposed to the economic impacts of European integration on their island economies, which relied heavily on agriculture, suffered from failed state-driven efforts at industrialisation, and struggled with problems of unemployment and population decline due to emigration. In Corsica, the UPC did not consider European integration to offer an economic lifeline for the island, whilst the FLNC was deeply concerned with the negative effects of freemarket economics. Likewise, the Psd'Az acknowledged that European economic integration presented major challenges as Sardinia was hampered by the free movement of goods, capital and peoples (Psd'Az 2004: 6) . The CAP was also perceived by SNRPs to undermine the islands' traditional pastoral economies.
Moreover, the instrumental Europeanism of SNRPs in Corsica and Sardinia since the 1990s was driven by the increase in receipt of European regional monies, rather than a reconsideration of the opportunities for economic viability as part of a European single market. SNRP support for European integration was thus dependent on the receipt of financial transfers from Brussels. In both places, however, the prospect of losing eligibility for such regional funds has been decried by SNRPs. A cessation in the tangible financial benefits of integration was met with more critical SNRP positions on Europe, which lament the failure of the EU to remedy the backwardness of the Corsican and Sardinian economies.
Clientelism and Patronage
A number of island scholars have noted that the lack of anonymity on small islands can foster nepotism, patronage, and political clientelism (Royle 2001 
